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STATEMENT OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
November 1, 2012 
Last year, after learning of an investigation being conducted by the Boston Globe Spotlight Team 
into the handling of jury-waived cases in the District Court and Boston Municipal Court Departments 
involving charges of operating vehicles under the influence of alcohol and drugs (OUI), the Justices of the 
Supreme Judicial Court appointed R.J. Cinquegrana of the law firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart LLP, as 
special counsel to conduct a confidential and independent preliminary inquiry.  We asked Mr. 
Cinquegrana to determine the rate of acquittal in jury-waived trials (bench trials) in OUI cases, and to 
examine whether that rate differs from the national average.  We also asked him to explore whether the 
acquittal rates of some judges in OUI bench trials are substantially greater than the statistical average, and if 
so, to identify possible reasons for the disparity.  We underscored that this was to be a preliminary, 
fact-finding inquiry, not a disciplinary inquiry.  We also acknowledged the delicate nature of even a 
preliminary inquiry into acquittal rates, recognizing that a judge conducting a bench trial is obligated under 
the law to find a defendant not guilty where the Commonwealth has failed to furnish credible evidence of 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and that we expect judges to honor that obligation without fear or favor.   
In preparing this Report, Mr. Cinquegrana and his law firm meticulously evaluated MassCourt and 
CourtView data from 56,966 OUI cases adjudicated in a forty-five month period between January 1, 2008 
and September 30, 2011, reviewed police reports and docket sheets for hundreds of cases, and listened to 
the tape recordings of fifty OUI trials.  They also interviewed, among others, every District Attorney in the 
Commonwealth, every Regional Administrative Justice in the District Court department, and eight defense 
attorneys who defend OUI cases, and met with eleven Boston Municipal Court judges.  The Justices have 
received the confidential Report of his preliminary inquiry, and have carefully considered its findings and 
recommendations.  Because the Report provides a thoughtful and careful analysis of systemic issues that 
affect the rate of conviction in OUI cases, and presents recommendations that warrant consideration by the 
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Judiciary, prosecutors, police, the Legislature, and the general public, we have decided to release the Report 
to the public.   
The Report finds that seventy-seven per cent of OUI cases resulted in a disposition that was adverse 
to the OUI defendant C either a guilty plea, an admission to sufficient facts to warrant a guilty finding, or a 
guilty finding after trial C which the Report refers to as the "conviction rate."  Thirteen per cent of OUI 
cases resulted in an acquittal after trial; the remaining ten per cent resulted in some other disposition, 
usually a dismissal for reasons not related to the merits of the case.  Although comparisons with other 
States are difficult because of the unavailability and distinguishing characteristics of data in many states, 
the overall conviction rate in OUI cases of seventy-seven per cent in Massachusetts appears comparable to 
that in other States.  Of the ten States for which conviction rates were found, the median conviction rate in 
OUI cases was 80.5 per cent, with Minnesota the lowest at seventy-four per cent and Michigan the highest 
at ninety-four per cent. 
Seventy-three per cent of all OUI cases were resolved by a plea of guilty or an admission to 
sufficient facts.  Only seventeen per cent proceeded to trial.  As noted above, the remaining ten per cent 
were dismissed before trial.  Of those defendants who proceeded to a trial by jury, fifty-eight per cent were 
acquitted.  Of those who proceeded to a bench trial, eighty-six per cent were acquitted.  
The Report identifies and carefully examines the systemic reasons that may contribute to the 
relatively high Statewide percentage of OUI defendants who are acquitted at trial in both bench and jury 
trials: 
$ Many OUI arrests are based, at least in part, on field test results that are rarely offered in evidence 
by the Commonwealth, either because they are not admissible in evidence at trial unless supported 
by expert testimony (e.g., the horizontal gaze nystagmus test) or because they do not comply with 
Massachusetts regulations (e.g. the preliminary breath test);  
 
$ An "after-the-fact" narrative description of a defendant=s performance on a field sobriety test may 
not persuasively demonstrate a defendant's lack of sobriety.  While video recording systems to 
memorialize a driver=s performance on field sobriety tests at the time they are conducted are used 
by police in some other States, few if any Massachusetts police departments make such video 
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recordings, with the result that recordings are rarely available to be offered in evidence in OUI 
trials in Massachusetts. 
 
$ Under existing Massachusetts law, a defendant's refusal to take a breathalyzer, blood alcohol test, 
or a field sobriety test is not admissible in evidence; 
 
$ In the interest of public safety, police officers may arrest a motorist where there is probable cause 
that the motorist is driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, regardless whether there is proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, because allowing such a motorist to continue driving may subject the 
police officer's city or town to civil liability if the motorist after the stop causes injury arising from 
an automobile accident; 
 
$ Even a breathalyzer or blood alcohol reading of .08 per cent or above does not necessarily result in 
conviction under the "per se" provision of the statute where there is reasonable doubt whether the 
reading accurately reflected the level of intoxication at the time of operation rather than the time of 
the test.  Prosecutors rarely offer expert evidence to rebut a defendant's contention that, based on 
retrograde extrapolation, there is reasonable doubt whether the defendant's blood alcohol level at 
the time of operation was .08 percent or higher. 
 
$ Experienced defense lawyers who specialize in OUI cases are often defending cases prosecuted by 
inexperienced Assistant District Attorneys with no special expertise in prosecuting these cases. 
 
The Report also identifies systemic reasons why the bench trial acquittal rate is twenty-eight per 
cent higher than the jury trial acquittal rate: 
$ Prosecutors seldom voluntarily dismiss OUI cases and may prefer weak cases to be resolved by a 
not guilty finding after a bench trial.  
 
$ Evidence of intoxication is often a litany of observations by police officers (glassy, bloodshot eyes, 
slurred speech, strong odor of alcohol, and unsteadiness walking) that are heard so often by judges 
that it is difficult to evaluate  credibility.  As the Report notes: 
 
"Given the repetitive nature of this evidence, prosecutors struggle to differentiate one case 
from the next, and to work with police witnesses to avoid presentation of testimony in a 
rote manner.  Judges who hear the same description of different cases may tend to 
discount the significance of what they hear.  Meanwhile, defense lawyers take advantage 
of the repetition to argue that police witnesses may not be offering a genuine description of 
events, but rather one that has been so rehearsed in other trials that it loses the ring of 
truth." 
 
Where the average bench trial acquittal rate Statewide was eighty-six per cent, it was not a simple 
task for Mr. Cinquegrana to evaluate whether the acquittal rate of some judges substantially deviated from 
the statistical average.  Through the pro bono help of Analysis Group, a consulting firm with expertise in 
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statistical analysis, the Report identified three factors that needed to be considered together to identify 
statistically significant disparities among judges and courts:  the judge=s bench trial acquittal rate, the 
percentage of cases assigned to the judge where a defendant chose to waive a jury trial and proceed with a 
bench trial before that judge, and the total number of OUI bench cases tried by the judge.  Applying these 
factors, the Report identifies judges in various courts in the State and one county (Worcester County) with 
statistically significant disparities.  The Report concluded that "[t]he record of near-100% acquittals and 
high waiver rates in certain courts, and before certain judges, creates an appearance of leniency.  In other 
courts, the dearth of waivers and bench trials raises concerns about the equal administration of the law."  
The Report cautions about the use of these statistics.  It declares that "[t]his information can be 
used to identify disparities in the handling of OUI cases in different settings, and it may be helpful in 
evaluating whether systemic changes should be made."  But it warns that "it would be a dangerous 
precedent to base any evaluation of individual judicial performance on these statistics," and adds, "More 
importantly, to hold judges accountable based on the computation of averages which may appear 
satisfactory to one side or the other would impair the independence of the Judiciary and subvert its role as 
the neutral arbiter in the administration of justice according to constitutional principles."    
We respect the wisdom of the Report's "word of caution."  Every case needs to be decided on its 
merits, and there is no "correct" rate of acquittal for any judge.  An acquittal, as a matter of law, is always 
the proper verdict where there is reasonable doubt of a defendant's guilt.  A judge's acquittal rate, whether 
it be statistically high or low, is not a proper measure of a judge's fairness; a judge is fair who impartially 
evaluates the evidence in each case and decides whether it meets the required standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.   
Nothing in the Report suggests that the bench trial acquittal rate is higher than the jury trial 
acquittal rate because of any judicial misconduct or any corrupt personal relationship between a judge and a 
defense attorney.  The Report states that none of the many people interviewed, including prosecutors, 
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defense lawyers, and judges, "reported an allegation that high acquittal rates in OUI cases are the product of 
corrupt relationships between lawyers and judges," or the "product of corrupt influence on judges."  Nor is 
there any simple explanation for these disparities; certainly, the Report did not find any.  The Report 
specifically notes: 
"Many OUI cases are indeed factually weak for the Commonwealth.  However, almost none are 
dismissed by prosecutors on that basis alone.  Prosecutors may be constrained to apply limited 
resources to more serious crimes, and defense attorneys vigorously contest evidence which is often 
presented in a rote and repetitive manner.  Thus, bench trial acquittals are to be expected at high 
rates." 
 
This preliminary inquiry was expressly not a disciplinary inquiry, and we find nothing in the Report to 
indicate that a disciplinary inquiry is warranted with respect to any judge's adjudication of OUI cases.  
The Report makes four recommendations.  Two of them may only be acted on by the Legislature.  
The first such recommendation is to amend the definition of the "per se" offense so that it criminalizes a 
proscribed blood alcohol level within a specific time period after operation, rather than at the time of 
operation.  Such an amendment would eliminate or reduce the reasonable doubt that may arise where a 
judge or jury concludes that the blood alcohol level at the time of operation of the vehicle may have been 
lower than at the time of the test because of the need for retrograde extrapolation.  The second such 
recommendation is to amend G. L. c. 90, ' 24 (1) (f) (1), to deny the restoration of a driver's license that is 
automatically suspended on refusal to take a breathalyzer test after dismissal or entry of a not guilty verdict 
on an OUI charge.  While the first recommendation may diminish the rate of acquittals, this second 
recommendation would not affect the rate but would diminish the consequence of an acquittal by requiring 
an automatic suspension to remain despite an acquittal.  Because the Report makes these recommendations 
for legislative action, we have forwarded a copy of the Report to the Governor, the Speaker of the House, 
the Senate President, and the Chairs of the Judiciary Committee for their review and consideration.   
Two other recommendations may be acted on by the Judiciary: changing the procedures for jury 
waiver, and judicial training focused on the judge's role as gatekeeper for scientific evidence.  In deciding 
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how to proceed as to these recommendations, we have consulted with Chief Justice of the Trial Court 
Robert Mulligan, Chief Justice Lynda Connolly of the District Court Department, and Chief Justice Charles 
Johnson of the Boston Municipal Court.   
The first recommendation calls for changes as to jury waiver to diminish the opportunity for what is 
popularly referred to as "judge shopping."  The Report suggests that the interests of justice and the 
perception of fairness would be served by changes to the practice of allowing a defendant's decision as to 
jury waiver to be postponed until the eve of trial.  We agree that this issue, which concerns more than OUI 
cases, merits careful consideration and therefore, in conjunction with Chief Justices Mulligan, Connolly, 
and Johnson, the Justices shall promptly establish a joint working group to make recommendations to the 
Supreme Judicial Court no later than March 30, 2013, as to whether the existing procedures regarding jury 
waiver in the District Court and Boston Municipal Court should be revised and, if so, what changes would 
be appropriate. 
The second recommendation that may be acted on by the Judiciary relates to the need for judicial 
training on a judge's gatekeeper role with respect to scientific evidence.  This recommendation also 
concerns more than OUI cases, and more than the issue raised in the Report regarding retrograde 
extrapolation.  Not only must judges make difficult decisions as to the reliability of scientific evidence 
when the admission of such expert evidence is challenged, but they must also determine whether they may 
consider scientific information they may have learned outside the trial from other sources, including expert 
testimony from other trials, in making judicial decisions.  We have asked our Judicial Institute to initiate 
efforts to provide judicial training on this subject for all judges in our trial and appellate courts.  
Apart from its specific recommendations, the Report has highlighted the need to consider whether 
the interests of justice and the perception of fairness would be enhanced if judges in criminal bench trials, 
after reaching their verdict, were to devote a brief period of time to explain orally on the record their reasons 
for reaching that verdict.  We shall ask the Standing Advisory Committee on the Rules of Criminal 
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Procedure to confer with the Chief Justice of the Trial Court and the Chief Justices of the relevant Trial 
Court departments, and examine whether a judicial rule should be promulgated that would require a brief 
oral explanation of a criminal bench verdict on the record. 
The Justices are grateful to Mr. Cinquegrana and the law firm of Choate, Hall & Stewart, LLP, and 
the statistical experts working with them, for a thoughtful and thorough report on a difficult and complex 
subject.  In keeping with the great pro bono tradition of the Massachusetts bar, they have devoted more 
than 4,000 hours to the preparation of the Report, without any compensation, to explore the systemic 
concerns initially raised by the Globe's Spotlight Team.  There are lessons to be learned from this Report 
by judges, legislators, prosecutors, defense counsel, and police officers as to how OUI crimes should be 
defined, investigated, prosecuted, defended, and tried.  The Justices intend to ensure that the lessons 
relevant to the Judiciary are well-learned and that appropriate steps are taken to ensure the fair and impartial 
administration of justice in OUI cases. 
